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FAVORITISM AND CORPORATE LAW: THE
CONFUSED CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY
DOCTRINE IN THE HYUNDAI
MOTOR CASE
Hwa-Jin Kim,* Seung Hwan Lee†, and Stephen M. Woodcock††
Core legal principles of U.S. corporate law are often met with perplexity
in foreign jurisdictions. This is especially true for legal principles that are
controversial even in the U.S. This Article takes the corporate opportunity
doctrine and examines how it has been exported to the civil law regime in
Korea. Korean conglomerates such as Samsung Group and Hyundai Mo-
tor Group have become major players in the global market, but corporate
law and practice in Korea have had a difficult time keeping up with devel-
opments in the business sector. The Hyundai Motor Case demonstrates an
ambitious, but ill-fated, attempt at the adoption of U.S. doctrine in Korea.
This Article explains and analyzes the case and the new codified corporate
opportunity doctrine rule in the Korean Commercial Code from a compar-
ative perspective, and suggests that the dialogue surrounding the corporate
opportunity doctrine in Korean legal and business communities is oriented
in the wrong direction and that the new rule needs substantial refinement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that you control one of the biggest corporations in the world
as the “controlling shareholder-manager.”1 As you approach retirement, a
succession plan becomes necessary, and you desire to pass control of the
* Hwa-Jin Kim is a Professor of Law at Seoul National University, and William W.
Cook Global Law Professor at the University of Michigan Law School. Professor Kim’s
research for this Article was supported by the Law Research Institute at Seoul National
University. The authors are grateful to the editors of the Michigan Journal of Private Equity
& Venture Capital Law for their excellent editorial assistance.
† Seung Hwan Lee, LL.B. magna cum laude Seoul National University School of
Law and Diploma (first in his class), Research and Training Institute of the Korean Supreme
Court, is an associate of Lee & Ko, Seoul, Korea.
†† Stephen Woodcock, J.D. magna cum laude University of Michigan Law School, is
an associate in the Chicago office of Jenner & Block LLP.
1. The controlling shareholder-manager is one of the characteristics of a concentrated
ownership economy and family-controlled firms. See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Family
Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange, 60 STAN. L. REV. 633
41
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corporation to your son.2 You want to prove to your shareholders and
managers that your son is a capable and experienced leader and that he
has the potential to be as successful as you have been in running the busi-
ness. Towards that end, you form a new, small firm, providing 40 percent
of the capital contribution; your son contributes the remaining 60 percent.
Your son will manage this new firm, and its success will prove his ability to
take your controlling position at the corporation once you step down. The
new firm engages in the business of providing certain services that are
necessary to your corporation and its affiliated companies, and you in-
struct your officers and employees to purchase those services exclusively
from your son’s firm, sometimes for a price higher than what could be
bargained for at arm’s length. Over a relatively short period of time, the
new firm grows into a public corporation, and the relationship between
your companies strengthens, resulting in massive profits for both you and
your son. This is the story of Hyundai Motor Company (“Hyundai Mo-
tor”) and Hyundai Glovis Co., Ltd. (“Hyundai Glovis”).3 We pose the fol-
lowing questions: under the corporate legal regime as it is today, has a
wrong been committed?; if so, what was it, and what legal principle has
been violated?; and, more specifically, is it against the law to favor your
son’s firm through the exercise of your managerial power?
Some activist shareholders of Hyundai Motor believed that the CEO
had violated the corporate opportunity doctrine and ought to be held lia-
ble; they brought a shareholder derivative lawsuit against Hyundai Mo-
tor’s chief executive.4 The problem for the suing shareholders was that
Korean law did not recognize the corporate opportunity doctrine at that
time.5 The doctrine was eventually written into the Korean Commercial
Code (“KCC”)6, which has since been amended to adopt the corporate
opportunity doctrine as it has developed over the decades in the United
(2007); Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating
the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (2006).
2. Passing control of the conglomerate is not easy due to the low cash-flow rights of
controlling shareholders and inheritance tax issues in Korea. For example, the average own-
ership of the controlling shareholders of non-public member firms of Samsung Group, the
biggest conglomerate in Korea, was 78.43 percent as of 2007, whereas their cash-flow rights
were as low as 19.43 percent. See James Jinho Chang & Hyun-Han Shin, Family Ownership
and Performance in Korean Conglomerates, 15 PACIFIC-BASIN FIN. J. 329, 334 (2007).
3. See Seoul Central District Court [Seoul C.D. Ct.], 2008GaHab47881, Feb. 25, 2011
(S. Kor.); PEOPLE’S SOLIDARITY FOR PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY ECON. REFORM RE-
SEARCH INST., REPORT ON THE SHARE TRANSACTION OF THE HEAD’S FAMILY MEMBERS OF
38 CONGLOMERATES 11 (Apr. 6, 2006) [hereinafter SHARE TRANSACTION REPORT].
4. Seoul Central District Court [Seoul C.D. Ct.], 2008GaHab47881, Feb. 25, 2011 (S.
Kor.).
5. For Korean Business Law in the English language, see KOREAN BUSINESS LAW
(Kim Hwa-Jin ed., 2012).
6. Commercial Act, Act No. 1000, Jan. 20, 1962, art. 397-2, amended by Act No.
10600, Apr. 14, 2011 (S. Kor.) [hereinafter KCC].
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States.7 Even so, courts have struggled with interpreting the doctrine and
the language of the statute, and confusion amongst legal professionals and
scholars in Korea persists. This is due, at least in part, to the fact that the
corporate opportunity doctrine is regarded as one of the most difficult le-
gal principles in U.S. corporate law and remains open to regular reinter-
pretation and criticism.8 This Article will explain the Hyundai Motor Case
and attempt to comparatively analyze the corporate opportunity doctrine
codified in the new KCC rule.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE AND COURT’S RULING
A. The Economic Background
South Korean conglomerates, or ‘Chaebols’ in Korean, are typically
global multinational companies that own numerous international enter-
prises, where each Chaebol is controlled by a single chairman.9 The
Chaebols’ rise, which was supported by various policies favoring large
companies and their owners, was tolerated by the Korean populace under
the belief that they greatly contributed to the rapid and remarkable
growth of the Korean economy.10 These conglomerates have grown to be
very large relative to the size of Korea’s overall economy. Samsung
Group, the biggest Chaebol, accounted for 13 percent of Korea’s GDP in
2011.11
One of the key characteristics of the Chaebols’ business operations is
the regular occurrence of related-party transactions amongst affiliated
firms. According to a report released by the Korea Fair Trade Commission
(the “KFTC”) on August 30, 2012,12 inter-affiliate transactions constitute
13.6 percent of all transactions by congomerates with a “controlling
7. See THE LEGISLATION AND JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMERCIAL ACT PROPOSED
AMENDMENT (INTRODUCED BY THE GOVERNMENT) REVIEW REPORT (CORPORATE LAW)
149-155 (2008) [hereinafter REVIEW REPORT].
8. See generally ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW ch. 7 (1986); Eric Talley, Turning
Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine,
108 YALE L.J. 277 (1998).
9. Dong-Hyeon Jung, Korean Chaebol in Transition, 40 CHINA REPORT 299, 299-303
(2004). See also Jeong Seo, Who Will Control Frankenstein? The Korean Chaebol’s Corporate
Governance, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 21 (2006); MYUNG HUN KANG, THE KOREAN
BUSINESS CONGLOMERATE: CHAEBOL THEN AND NOW (1996).
10. See Hwa-Jin Kim, Living with the IMF: A New Approach to Corporate Governance
and Regulation of Financial Institutions in Korea, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 61, 63 (1999).
11. See Simon Mundy & Song Jung-a, Mighty Samsung weighs heavy on S Korea, FIN.
TIMES, [Nov. 14, 2012, 1:43 PM] www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e2ecefe2-3e72-11e2-829d-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2wkq.nVhc.
12. See FAIR TRADE COMM’N, ANALYSIS OF INTER-AFFILIATE TRANSACTIONS IN
CHAEBOL (2012) [hereinafter KFTC REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.go.kr/news/ftc/re-
portView.jsp?report_data_no=4906&tribu_type_cd=&report_data_div_cd=&currpage=1&
searchKey=1&searchVal= &stdate=&enddate=.
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head,”13 which is 2.5 percent higher than conglomerates without control-
ling heads. Companies with a higher percentage of equity owned by affili-
ates, the chairman’s relatives, and the second generations of the
chairman’s family were similarly found to have a relatively higher ratio of
inter-affiliate transactions and, in particular, when descendants of the
chairman’s family owned more than 50 percent of the company’s shares,
the ratio of inter-affiliate transactions was as high as 56.3 percent.14
This propensity for inter-affiliated transactions, along with the preda-
tory business expansions made by some Chaebols, has caused the Korean
public to become highly skeptical of the ‘Chaebol-centric’ economic struc-
ture of Korea. In their 2012 presidential campaigns, all candidates prom-
ised that they would impose reform on the Chaebols and their corporate
governance and practices.15 The opposition leaders went further and con-
tended that Chaebols should be disassembled like Standard Oil and AT&T
in the United States and big Japanese conglomerates before World War
II.16 Such an action would wreak havoc on Korea’s corporate governance
and industrial policies. Corporate governance and finance scholarship and
practice will also face new and difficult questions, and will do so in an
increasingly globalized business and financial environment.17 In this Arti-
cle, we analyze Chaebols from the perspective of corporate law.
B. The Scheme and Background of the Case
The actions taken by Hyundai Motor’s controlling shareholder-man-
ager are typical of business practices in Korea in the past decade. Korean
conglomerates commonly either split off segments of their affiliates’ ex-
isting businesses into a separate enterprise or establish a new company
altogether to engage in a closely related business, with the chairman’s fam-
ily members acquiring the new company’s shares at the time of its estab-
lishment or sometime thereafter.18 Such transactions cannot, with any
certainty, be lumped together and presumed to all serve the same purpose
(especially considering the limited publicly-available information). How-
13. In this context, a “controlling head” means a “natural person” who substantially
controls the whole conglomerate pursuant to the standards prescribed by the Enforcement
Decree of the Monopoly Regulations and Fair Trade Act of Korea.
14. KFTC REPORT, supra note 12, at 8.
15. See PUBLIC PROMISE BOOK OF SAENURI PARTY 150-151 (2012); PUBLIC PROMISE
BOOK OF DEMOCRATIC UNITED PARTY 106-107 (2012); PUBLIC PROMISE BOOK OF UNITED
PROGRESSIVE PARTY 75-80 (2012).
16. PUBLIC PROMISE BOOK OF UNITED PROGRESSIVE PARTY, supra note 15, at 75-78.
17. For Korea’s efforts in improvement of corporate governance, see Bernard Black et
al., Corporate Governance in Korea at the Millennium: Enhancing International Competitive-
ness, 26 J. CORP. L. 537 (2001); Bernard S. Black et al., Does Corporate Governance Predict
Firms’ Market Values? Evidence from Korea, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 366 (2006); Hwa-Jin
Kim, Toward the “Best Practice” Model in a Globalizing Market: Recent Developments in
Korean Corporate Governance, 2 J. CORP. L. STUD. 345 (2002).
18. See KIM HWA-JIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE 322 (2nd ed. 2012)
[hereinafter KIM, CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE].
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ever, one can easily conclude that these transactions, when combined with
the so-called “Funneling of Business” to the newly established company
(Mul-lyang-mol-a-ju-gi, in Korean), are being used to solve the succession
problem that many conglomerates face. This is not a new observation, nor
have the transactions gone unnoticed or unopposed: activist shareholders
have been vocal critics of the practice, and an active public dialogue on the
issue is ongoing.19
Although activist shareholders have frequently asserted that the con-
glomerate transactions are really veiled appropriations of corporate op-
portunities, there are relatively few cases in which suit has been filed and a
court has had the opportunity to examine the transaction and apply corpo-
ration law. This can be partially explained by Korea’s unique legal system
and culture. More fundamental explanations are (i) the lack of a specific
and explicit regulation governing the corporate opportunity doctrine in
Korea’s civil law system, and (ii) the fact that, despite the doctrine’s basis
in director duty of loyalty under KCC Article 382-3,20 there is insufficient
precedent or other legal underpinnings to convincingly apply the corpo-
rate opportunity doctrine to inter-affiliate transactions. Despite these cir-
cumstances, one Korean court recently took a remarkable step toward
strengthening the corporate opportunity doctrine. Below, we discuss the
court’s ruling in the Hyundai Motor Shareholder Derivative Suit (“Hy-
undai Motor Case”).
C. The Case and Court’s Ruling21
The plaintiffs in the case against Hyundai Motor are the civic group
Solidarity for Economic Reform and minority shareholders of Hyundai
Motor. The defendants are Chung Mongkoo, Hyundai Motor’s CEO and
head of Hyundai Motor Group, and Kim Dongjin, President of Hyundai
Motor. According to the court ruling, the facts of the case are as follows:22
19. SHARE TRANSACTION REPORT, supra note 3, at 11. According to the report, ‘ap-
propriation of corporate opportunity’ has been found in nearly all conglomerates, and it has
been widely used as a tool for illegal succession taking advantage of loopholes in the KCC
and the Korean tax act. The report has been updated four times between its first publication
and November 2012. PEOPLE’S SOLIDARITY FOR PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY ECON. RE-
FORM RESEARCH INST., THE FIFTH REPORT ON THE PROBLEMATIC SHARE TRANSACTION OF
THE HEAD’S FAMILY MEMBERS OF CONGLOMERATES (2012) [hereinafter THE 5TH REPORT].
According to the last report, there were 66 cases suspected of “appropriation of corporate
opportunity.” Id. at 12. By the end of 2011, the wealth of chairmen’s families had increased
from such cases by approximately KRW 10.4299 trillion, and their average earning rate had
increased by 1,256 percent. Id. at 25.
20. KCC art. 382-3 (“Directors shall perform their duties in good faith for the interest
of the company in accordance with Acts, subordinate statutes, and the articles of
incorporation.”).
21. Seoul Central District Court [Seoul C.D. Ct.], 2008GaHab47881, Feb. 25, 2011 (S.
Kor.).
22. Id. at 3-4, 6-11, 42-44.
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Hyundai Glovis, a company specializing in the distribution service business,
was established to unify and combine Hyundai Motor Group’s distribution
services. At the time of Hyundai Glovis’s establishment, its shareholders were
Chung Mongkoo (40%) and his eldest son Chung Uiseon (60%). Hyundai
Motor Group’s affiliates, such as Hyundai Motor, Kia Motors Corporation,
Hyundai Mobis Co., Ltd. (“Hyundai Mobis”), and Hyundai Steel Company,
did business with Hyundai Glovis in nearly all areas, including automobile,
steel and component delivery; leasing services for distribution equipment; do-
mestic PDI (Pre-delivery Inspection) work; T/P (Transporter) sector; and
other delivery-related services, through business transfers or private contracts.
The aggregate financial payments between Hyundai Motor Group and Hy-
undai Glovis reached KRW 568.9 billion between March 2001 and June
2004.23 During that time, the KFTC imposed a penalty surcharge of KRW 4.7
billion on Hyundai Motor for illegally supporting Hyundai Glovis. The KFTC
levied the penalty on the grounds that Hyundai Motor Group was providing
excessive financial return to Hyundai Glovis by allotting most of its affiliate
companies’ transportation needs to Hyundai Glovis on terms that were not
arm’s length. It further noted that the business capabilities of the relatively
new Hyundai Glovis had not been tested or verified.24
Numerous issues were raised in the litigation. Among them, the plain-
tiffs argued that the directors of Hyundai Motor had usurped a corporate
opportunity, stating:
(i) Transportation or distribution services including transportation broker ser-
vice that Hyundai Glovis is engaged in, provides essential assistance to Hy-
undai Motor Group’s affiliates. Hyundai Motor’s working group has for a long
time, been striving to establish an integrated distribution company through
share investments by Hyundai Motor Group and its affiliates. (ii) Therefore
the distribution service by Hyundai Glovis falls under the scope of business
opportunity for Hyundai Motor. (iii) It can be expected that Chung Mongkoo
as a controlling shareholder and CEO of Hyundai Motor would have gained
enormous benefits by acquiring shares of the integrated distribution company.
Furthermore Hyundai Motor’s distribution service is one of the most impor-
tant sectors in the company’s scope of business. Therefore, since Hyundai Mo-
tor could financially afford to acquire major shares of Hyundai Glovis, such a
plan should have been reviewed and reported to the board of directors and
measures should have been taken, so that the board of directors could make a
resolution for the acquisition of the shares of Hyundai Glovis. (iv) Neverthe-
less, CEO Chung Mongkoo and his son secretly acquired the shares of Hy-
undai Glovis, without any process of reporting such agenda to the board of
directors. (v) Such an act clearly constitutes appropriation of Hyundai Motor’s
corporate opportunity as CEO Chung Mongkoo and his son Chung Uiseon
23. After June 2004, Chung Mongkoo and Chung Uiseon sold some of their shares of
Hyundai Glovis to Wilhelmson, a Norwegian shipping company, and received approximately
KRW 100 billion from the sale. Hyundai Glovis was subsequently listed in the KOSPI stock
market in January 2006, at which time Chung Mongkoo and Chung Uiseon earned approxi-
mately KRW 400 billion of book valuation profit. SHARE TRANSACTION REPORT, supra note
3, at 21.
24. Hyundai Motor Group filed, but lost, a lawsuit for revocation of the KFTC’s dispo-
sition. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Du15494, Oct. 25, 2012 (S. Kor.).
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privately gained benefits by depriving Hyundai Motor of its business
opportunity.25
At the time this judgment was rendered, the Amended KCC’s Article
on Prohibition against Appropriation of Company’s Opportunities and
Assets (discussed infra, Part III) was not in effect.26 Nevertheless, the
court acknowledged that a bar against the appropriation of a corporate
opportunity could be derived from concepts already existing in the pre-
amendment KCC: the duty of good manager’s due care or duty of loy-
alty.27 It then defined the concept of appropriation of corporate opportu-
nity as “a principle that anyone, such as the director or executive member
of the company, who has a duty of loyalty shall not unfairly seize the com-
pany’s opportunity for [his] own benefit, by using his status as a fiduciary
and fiduciary relations.”28 However, the court also ruled that the director
is not obliged to actively transfer all of the business opportunities of which
he or she is aware to the company, since ‘business opportunity’ is an ex-
pansive and vague concept; moreover, the duty of good manager’s due
care and the duty of loyalty are fiduciary duties owed in conjunction with
the performance of corporate activities, not a general duty to take every
action potentially beneficial to the company.29
The court provided a narrow interpretation of the doctrine. In deter-
mining whether a director has deprived the company of its expectation
profits by violating the duty of loyalty, the analysis of the business oppor-
tunity should be restricted to “realistically existing specific business oppor-
tunities.”30 In other words, for a business opportunity to have been
properly owed to the company, there must have been: (i) an existing, real-
istic, and specific opportunity for the company, of which it was the subject
of specific discussions or advantageous conditions; and (ii) substantial
probability that the company would have taken that business opportunity,
the reasonable basis for which was derived from the existing company’s
business judgment and based on factors such as business strategy, business
type, financial conditions, business characteristics, investment size, burden
of risk, and expected income. When both conditions hold true, then the
director has the duty of good manager’s due care or duty of loyalty to
cause the company to take such business opportunity. Conversely, when,
under such circumstances, the director has seized or usurped the com-
pany’s business opportunity, there exists a violation of duty of good man-
ager’s due care or duty of loyalty.
25. See Seoul Central District Court [Seoul C.D. Ct.], 2008GaHab47881, Feb. 25, 2011
(S. Kor.), at 40-41.
26. The bill amending the relevant portion of the KCC was before Parliament at the
time but had not yet been passed.
27. See KCC art. 382-3.
28. See Seoul Central District Court [Seoul C.D. Ct.], 2008GaHab47881, Feb. 25, 2011
(S. Kor.), at 41.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 41-42.
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The court ruled that there was an insufficient basis to prove that the
market segment entered by Hyundai Glovis was Hyundai Motor’s existing,
realistic and specific business opportunity.31 CEO Chung Mongkoo did
not, therefore, have a duty of good manager’s due care or duty of loyalty
to offer Hyundai Motor the opportunity to purchase Hyundai Glovis
shares when it was established.32 Because Chung Mongkoo did not have a
duty to do so, he did not unfairly seize or usurp the Hyundai Motor
Group’s business opportunity. The considerations behind the court’s deci-
sion were: (i) while Hyundai Glovis’s distribution services were related to
Hyundai Motor Group’s manufacturing and sales, an automobile company
does not have to conduct its own distribution or establish a subsidiary for
its distribution – this is a business judgment decision and, thus, whether to
establish an internal business unit, establish a subsidiary, or outsource it to
another company is fundamentally at the discretion of the company’s di-
rectors’ business judgment; (ii) the decision to establish Hyundai Glovis
was spurred by the desire to effectively manage the distribution services of
all of the Hyundai Motor Group’s affiliates, the direct trigger for which
was CEO Chung Mongkoo’s order; and (iii) employees of Hyundai Motor
Group’s affiliates, not just those of Hyundai Motor itself, worked to estab-
lish and advance Hyundai Glovis, and Hyundai Glovis similarly provides
services for Hyundai Motor Group’s affiliates, including Kia Motors Cor-
poration, Hyundai Mobis, and Hyundai Steel Company.33
Although the court did not rule that CEO Chung Mongkoo had
usurped Hyundai Motor Group’s business opportunity, it did find that, by
unfairly raising freight charges to be paid to Hyundai Glovis, Hyundai Mo-
tor caused a loss of approximately KRW 14.3 billion.34 Further, the KFTC
imposed a KRW 4.7 billion penalty for this illegal action,35 resulting in a
total loss to Hyundai Motor of KRW 19 billion. Taking the overall circum-
stances into consideration,36 Chung Mongkoo’s liability was limited to 90
31. Id. at 46.
32. Id. at 47-48.
33. Id. at 44-46.
34. See Seoul Central District Court [Seoul C.D. Ct.], 2008GaHab47881, Feb. 25, 2011
(S. Kor.), at 50-54.
35. Id. at 9-11.
36. The Korean Court has ruled that:
where the director is liable for damages from violating laws or articles of associations, or
from neglecting duties, then the amount of damages can be limited according to equity
in apportionment of damages, which is the ideology of indemnification of damages, tak-
ing every circumstance into consideration, including but not limited to, the substance
and nature of the business, the type and process of the director’s breach of duties, objec-
tive circumstances or the extent of the occurrence of the damages, the director’s contri-
butions to the company, the director’s profit from the breach of duties, lack of
organizational system in the company or lack of risk management system.
See, e.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2002Da60467, Dec. 10, 2004 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S.
Ct.], 2003Da69638, Oct. 28, 2005 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct], 2005Da34797, Sept. 21,
2007 (S. Kor.). In the Hyundai Motor Case, the court considered Chung Mongkoo’s contribu-
tion to Hyundai Motor, the possibilities of inaccuracy in calculating damages, the amount of
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percent of the loss (about KRW 17.1 billion).37 He and the minority share-
holders all waived their rights to an appeal.38 The litigation ultimately con-
cluded when plaintiff Solidarity for Economic Reform and Chung
Mongkoo mutually agreed that he would divest his interest in Hyundai
Glovis within a reasonable period of time, the goal of which was to avoid
any further controversy around the issue.39
III. THE NEW COMMERCIAL CODE
Korea amended its Commercial Code (the “KCC” or the “Code”) as
of April 14, 2011.40 The amendment inserted Article 397-2, which ex-
pressly adopted the corporate opportunity doctrine. The newly inserted
Article 397-2 reads as follows:41
KCC Article 397-2 (Prohibition against Appropriation of Company’s
Opportunities and Assets)
(1) No director shall use any business opportunity of the company which cor-
responds to any of the following subparagraphs and may be of present or
future benefit to the company, for his/her own account or for the account
of a third party, without the approval of the board of directors. In such
cases, the approval of the board of directors shall be granted with two
thirds or more of the total number of directors;
1. A business opportunity which has become known to the director in
the course of performing his/her duty, or a business opportunity tak-
ing advantage of information of the company;
2. A business opportunity closely related to the business that is being
currently conducted or is to be conducted by the company;
(2) A director who has violated paragraph (1) and thereby incurred damage
to the company and the director who approved the same shall be jointly
and severally liable for compensation of the damage; and the benefit
earned by the director or a third party from the violation shall be pre-
sumed to be the damage suffered by the company.
personal profit from the breach of duties etc. See Seoul Central District Court [Seoul C.D.
Ct.], 2008GaHab47881, Feb. 25, 2011 (S. Kor.), at 58-59.
37. See Seoul Central District Court [Seoul C.D. Ct.], 2008GaHab47881, Feb. 25, 2011
(S. Kor.), at 58-59. Whether there were illegal supporting actions to Hyundai Mobis Co., Ltd.
and Kia Motors Corporation was also an issue, which is irrelevant to the subject of this arti-
cle. Id. When considering these issues as well, the damages totaled approximately KRW 185.8
billion, with KRW 82.6 billion of that sum owed by CEO Chung Mongkoo.
38. THE 5TH REPORT, supra note 19, at 16.
39. After this settlement was reached, Chung Mongkoo both paid out or sold some of
his shares in Hyundai Glovis as damages and donated some of the shares to Hyundai Motor
Chung Mongkoo Foundation. Id. As of now, Chung Uiseon owns 31.88 percent, Chung
Mongkoo owns 11.51 percent, Hyundai Motor owns 4.88 percent, and Hyundai Motor Chung
Mongkoo Foundation owns 4.46 percent of Hyundai Glovis’s shares.
40. The newly-amended KCC came into effect on April 14, 2012.
41. KCC Article 397-2 is very much like AM. LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORP.
GOVERNANCE (1994) and its relevant rules. The KCC, its case law, and its interpretation have
developed in such a way as to incorporate laws regarding Anglo-American director liability.
The insertion of Article 397-2 in the KCC can be seen as a continuation of such tendency in
the KCC.
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The legislative process to adopt this corporate opportunity doctrine
amendment was controversial.42 Some felt the legislation was superfluous
since the appropriation of a corporate opportunity can be theoretically
covered by existing articles of the Code, particularly those related to a
director’s duty of loyalty (Article 382-3), a director’s prohibition against
competitive business (Article 397 paragraph 1), or a director’s prohibition
against self-dealing transactions (Article 398).43 Others argued that ambi-
guities in the new legislation could lead to excessive lawsuits, discourage
CEOs from pursuing innovative business opportunities, and have negative
effects on social welfare.44 On the other hand, supporters of the legislation
pointed to both the practical difficulties of holding directors responsible
under the general duty of loyalty and the fact that in Korea many corpo-
rate opportunity appropriation cases are not based on directors’ prohib-
ited operation of competing businesses or self-dealing transactions.45 They
argued that an explicit provision for the corporate opportunity doctrine
was necessary to clarify the substantive and procedural applicability as
well as liability for violation.46
The Korean Ministry of Justice initially announced that the corporate
opportunity doctrine would be adopted as a declaratory article, providing
that “no director shall use any business opportunity of the company that
may be of present or future benefit to the company, for his/her own ac-
42. The newly-inserted corporate opportunity doctrine was one of the three major is-
sues for the Ministry of Justice in the legislative process, along with double derivative suits
and executive director legislation. Because the issue had huge potential social and political
ramifications, the Commercial Code Issue Mediation Committee went through a lengthy and
arduous process to finalize the provision. Koo Seungmo, Legislative Process in Corporate
Law of the Commercial Code and Tasks to be Solved, 55 ADVANCED COM. L. REV. 115, 123
(2011).
43. In the above Hyundai Motor Case, the court also acknowledged that the concept
“appropriation of corporate opportunity” could be derived from the existing KCC concepts
of duty of good manager’s due care or duty of loyalty. Seoul Central District Court [Seoul
C.D. Ct.], 2008GaHab47881, Feb. 25, 2011 (S. Kor.), at 41.
44. Legal professionals and scholars who are against the legislation are as follows:
Choi Junseon, The Doctrine of Corporate Opportunity, 95 JUSTICE 123 (2006) [hereinafter
Choi Junseon, Corporate Opportunity]; Choi Wanjin, Critical Observation of the Commercial
Law Draft Revision, 17 BUS. ADMIN. & L. 1 (2007); Kim Jeongho, The Doctrine of Corporate
Opportunity, 17 BUS. ADMIN. & L. 129 (2007) [hereinafter Kim Jeongho, Doctrine of Corpo-
rate Opportunity]; Jae Yeol Kwon et al., Corporate Opportunity Doctrine—A Comparative
Law Analysis of a Compromise Reform Proposal on the Commercial Code, 25 COM. L. REV.
71 (2007); S. KOR. LISTED COS. ASS’N, REVIEW ON THE AMENDED COMMERCIAL LAW
(2009).
45. Legal professionals and scholars who are for the legislation are as follows: Lim Jai
Yun, Usurpation of Corporate Opportunity, 363 HUM. RTS. & JUST. 176 (2006); Baik Jeong-
Woong, The U.S. Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and the Korea Commercial Code, 25 COM.
L. REV. 361 (2006); Kwon Soon-Hee, A Study on Usurpation of Corporate Opportunity in
Article 398 Section 3 of the Reform Proposal to the Commercial Code, 26 COM. L. REV. 27
(2007).
46. See supra, note 45.
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count or for the account of a third party.”47 Upon submission to the Na-
tional Assembly, however, the doctrine itself materialized with respect to
cases of appropriation arising via self-dealing director transactions, no
longer a mere declaratory article.48 Some members of the National As-
sembly still argued that a powerful regulation by law was necessary. Six
amendments to the bill were proposed,49 including one that would have
expanded the doctrine’s applicability to also include major shareholders
and related persons and granted a right of intervention in appropriation of
corporate opportunity cases similar to that permitted against a director’s
operation of competitive business (KCC Article 397 paragraph 2).50 An
agreement was eventually reached to insert new Article 397-2, as written
above. Such a complicated legislative history is an indication of how sensi-
tive public opinion was to the incorporation of the corporate opportunity
doctrine into law.51 It also reveals that no clear or consistent consensus on
the content or legal nature of the corporate opportunity doctrine has been
formed yet in Korea.52
It must be noted that, unlike the U.S., Korea has sought to regulate its
conglomerates’ so-called “Funneling of Business,”53 the transfer of wealth
to controlling shareholders and their related persons by conglomerates’
affiliates. As discussed above, major civic groups in Korea have repeatedly
opposed such practice as a suspected case of the usurpation of corporate
47. See Press Release, Ministry of Justice, Republic of Kor., Main points on the
Amendments to the Commercial (Company) Act (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.moj.go.kr/HP/
COM/bbs_03/ShowData.do?strNbodCd=noti0005&strWrtNo=2430&strAnsNo=A&strFile
Path=moj/&strRtnURL=MOJ_30200000&strOrgGbnCd=100000.
48. For appropriation of corporate opportunity that was not classified as a self-dealing
transaction, Article 382-3, the provision governing directors’ duty of loyalty, applied.
49. See Amendments to the Commercial Act, NAT’L ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KOR., http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/jsp/BillDetail.jsp?bill_id=PRC_R1U1N0Y3S0E9Y1W5
A5L0X1G7J3Q7I9 (last visited January 29, 2014).
50. KCC Article 397 states:
(1) No director shall, without the approval of the board of directors, engage in for his/
her own account or for the account of a third party any transaction in the same line of
business of the company or become an unlimited liability member or a director of any
other company, the business purposes of which are the same as those of the company.
(2) If any director has engaged in a transaction for his/her own account in contravention
of paragraph (1), the company and if he/she has made a transaction for the account of a
third party, the company may request the pertinent director to transfer any interest ac-
crued therefrom. (3) Rights under paragraph (2) shall be extinct upon the lapse of one
year after the date such transaction has been made.
51. Chun Kyung Hoon, How to Interpret New Regulations on Usurpation of Corporate
Opportunity under the Recent Amendment to the Korean Commercial Code, 30 CORP. PRI-
VATE L. REV. 143, 145 (2011).
52. Some scholars argue that, in Korea, discussions about the “need” to regulate direc-
tors’ appropriation of corporate opportunity are taking place despite a lack of consensus
regarding, or criteria for determining, what exactly corporate opportunity is, what kind of
liability should be imposed, and through which standards. See Kim Hongki, Corporate Op-
portunity Doctrine and it’s [sic] Implication for the Interpretation and Regulations in Korea, 21
COM. L. CASE REV. 99, 101 (2008) [hereinafter Kim Hongki, Corporate Opportunity].
53. KIM, CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 18, at 322.
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opportunities. This “Funneling of Business” practice likely heavily influ-
enced Korea’s adoption of Article 372-2. This proposition is reflected in
the Legislation and Judiciary Committee’s Review Report on the pro-
posed amendment of the KCC submitted to the National Assembly.54 The
Review Report points to the Hyundai Motor Case, stating that “[r]ecently
a number of representative directors or controlling shareholders have
usurped business opportunities to reinforce their control over the com-
pany or transfer their management control. However [,] it is difficult to
regulate these transactions through existing regulations such as duty of
loyalty or prohibition against self-dealing transactions by directors.”55 Ac-
cording to the Review Report, in order to regulate these types of transac-
tions, a provision incorporating the corporate opportunity doctrine is
needed.
IV. THE U.S. LAW
Because the origins of the corporate opportunity doctrine can be
traced back to case law developed under the United States legal regime, a
study of Korean Commercial Code Article 397-2 and the concept of a
“business opportunity” thereunder logically begins with a survey of the
U.S. doctrine. This is especially true considering that the Korean doctrine
is understood to have adopted the American Law Institute’s defining prin-
ciples on the corporate opportunity doctrine.56 Consequently, preceding
our analysis of Korean Commercial Code Article 397-2, this section pro-
vides a look at the history and formulation of the corporate opportunity
doctrine in the United States. The state of Delaware is the dominant juris-
diction for corporations in the United States;57 as such, the focus is on the
development of Delaware case law.
A. History of the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine in the United States
The classic statement of the corporate opportunity doctrine is set forth
in Guth v. Loft,58 a case decided in 1939 by the Delaware Supreme Court
(discussed further below). The doctrine is a logical extension of the duty of
loyalty, one of the oldest and most basic fiduciary principles.59 The fiduci-
ary duty of loyalty embodies the general principle that one who under-
takes to act on behalf of another must not place his own interests ahead of
the interests of his principal,60 a concept that can be traced back more
54. REVIEW REPORT, supra note 7, 150-51.
55. Id. at 152-53.
56. AM. LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 5.05(b) (1994).
57. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 553-54 (2002).
58. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510-11 (Del. 1939).
59. John E. Jackson III, Corporate Opportunity Doctrine: A Historical View with a
Proposed Solution, 53 MO. L. REV. 393, 394 (1988).
60. See generally Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
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than eight centuries and is found in many of the earliest written codes of
law.61
While the duty of loyalty can be stated succinctly and is a foundational
principle in many areas of law, applying the principle to a set of facts has
often proven to be complicated and controversial—a challenge that has
been especially true of the corporate opportunity doctrine. The opinions in
Guth and subsequent corporate opportunity cases reveal a judiciary that
has struggled to create a standard for the straightforward application of
doctrine to facts and, in the process, has created a complex body of tests,
factors, and case law precedent. Before exploring the path that the doc-
trine has taken through judicial inquiry and analysis over the past 70 years,
however, it is helpful to understand its basic framework. The simplified
illustration below shows the basic steps to consider when determining
whether taking a business opportunity may constitute a breach of the cor-
porate opportunity doctrine under U.S. law:
B. The Evolution of Case Law
Application of the corporate opportunity doctrine in Delaware gener-
ally begins with a statement of the doctrine from Guth v. Loft.62 In Guth,
the president and director of Loft Incorporated (a candy, syrup and foods
manufacturer) acquired a controlling interest in the Pepsi-Cola Corpora-
tion and began secretly using the resources of Loft to support Pepsi’s oper-
61. See, e.g., Hammurabi’s Code of Laws; The Great Qing Code.
62. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Rethinking Delaware’s Corporate Opportunity Doc-
trine 5 (UCLA Sch. of Law, L. & Econ Res. Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-17, 2008).
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ations.63 Loft sued Guth, alleging that Guth had an obligation, as its
president and a director, to offer Loft the opportunity to acquire that in-
terest in Pepsi.64 The court found in favor of Loft, and the Delaware Su-
preme Court has since stated:
The rule of the Guth case is that when there is presented to a corporate officer
a business opportunity which the corporation is financially able to undertake,
and which, by its nature, falls into the line of the corporation’s business and is
of practical advantage to it, or is an opportunity in which the corporation has
an actual or expectant interest [(respectively, the “line of business” test and
the “interest or expectancy” test)], the officer is prohibited from permitting
his self-interest to be brought into conflict with the corporation’s interest and
may not take the opportunity for himself.65
The court also observed that the prohibition against corporate officers
and directors using their position of trust and confidence to further their
private interests is essentially public policy; it is derived from a profound
knowledge of human characteristics and is merely one of the manifesta-
tions of the general duties of loyalty and good faith.66 The judiciary itself
struggled to apply the Guth rule and to adapt it to factual scenarios, stating
“[t]he occasions for the determination of honesty, good faith and loyal
conduct are many and varied, and no hard and fast rule can be formulated
. . . [t]he standard of loyalty is measured by no fixed scale.”67 The court
thus foresaw the application problems that would arise in the following
decades.
Johnston v. Greene came before the Delaware Supreme Court 17 years
later and presented a more complex set of facts.68 The director who was
offered the relevant opportunity was involved in the management of many
similar businesses (each of which plausibly had an interest in the offer)
and had received the offer in his individual capacity, rather than as a direc-
tor of any corporation (the offeror was not aware of his affiliations).69
Furthermore, the Court found that the key corporation in question had no
well-defined “line of business.”70 Although the court stated that it was
applying the Guth rule, it focused almost exclusively on the line-of-busi-
ness test and the fact that the director had received the offer in his per-
63. Guth, 5 A.2d at 506.
64. Id. at 507-08.
65. Equity Corp. v. Milton, 221 A.2d 494, 497 (Del. 1966).
66. Guth, 5 A.2d at 510.
67. Id.
68. Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919 (Del. 1956).
69. Id. at 923.
70. Id. at 921 (This finding allowed the Court to avoid applying the “line of business”
test as set forth in Guth, which simply states that an opportunity is presumed to belong to a
corporation if the opportunity is one that would logically fall within the “line of business”
that the corporation is engaged in. This is an important point because it further highlights the
difficulty of developing a rigid framework for applying the corporate opportunity doctrine
and the importance of a flexible, fact-based application.).
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sonal capacity.71 The court held that, where an officer receives an offer in
his individual capacity, a much stricter standard should be applied to de-
termine if the opportunity is one to which the corporation is entitled.72 In
such a scenario, it must be shown that the opportunity is either directly or
closely related to the corporation’s business, or one to which the corpora-
tion has a specific interest or expectancy.73 The court also repeatedly ref-
erenced “fairness” in the analysis, stating that “whether an opportunity is
corporate or personal depends on the facts—upon the existence of special
circumstances that would make it unfair for the director or officer to take
the opportunity for himself.74 Johnston presented an especially difficult
question for the line-of-business test of corporate opportunity, since a
finding that the director took a corporate opportunity then raises the chal-
lenge of determining to which of the corporations the opportunity would
belong, likely pushing the court to employ a fact-based fairness analysis.75
In the 1971 case of Kaplan v. Fenton, the Delaware Supreme Court
identified two additional factors for assessing corporate opportunity ap-
propriation that it found relevant to affirming the Delaware Chancery
Court’s holding that a director had not usurped a corporate opportunity.76
In Kaplan, the director purchased shares in a corporation for his own ac-
count, but only after (i) a similar offer was rejected by the board of the
corporation months before and (ii) the director disclosed the second offer
to the CEO of the corporation and asked him whether it should be
presented to the entire board (the CEO said that it should not).77 The
Delaware Supreme Court found both of these events to be relevant to
their analysis and to their findings that (i) the offer was not one in which
the corporation had an interest (as it had been expressly disclaimed), (ii) it
was not an opportunity that was essential to the corporation, and (iii) it
was not one in which the corporation’s resources had been improperly put
to use.78
Science Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp., decided by the
Delaware Supreme Court in 1980, demonstrates the ongoing struggle in
the application of the corporate opportunity doctrine, now interpreting the
Guth and Johnston standards as a straightforward three-prong analysis:
“[An] officer may not seize the opportunity for his own if: (a) the corpora-
tion is financially able to undertake it; (b) it is within the corporation’s line
of business; (c) the corporation is interested in the opportunity.”79 Fur-
thermore, the facts of Science Accessories caused the court to consider the
71. Id. at 923.
72. Id. at 923-25.
73. Id. at 923.
74. Johnston, 121 A.2d at 924.
75. Id. at 923.
76. Kaplan v. Fenton, 278 A.2d 834 (Del. 1971).
77. Id. at 835.
78. Id. at 836.
79. Science Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp., 425 A.2d 957, 963 (Del. 1980).
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corporate opportunity doctrine alongside a competing public interest, the
“policy ‘recognized by the courts . . . of safeguarding society’s interest in
fostering free and vigorous competition in the economic sphere.’”80 The
court, citing the Restatement of Agency, concluded that “while an agent
may not put himself in a position antagonistic to his principal, an agent is
not thereby prevented from acting in good faith outside his employment
even though it may adversely affect his principal’s business.”81 Further, an
agent may “make arrangements or plans to go into competition with his
principal before terminating his agency, provided no unfair acts are com-
mitted or injury done his principal.”82
Broz v. Cellular Information Systems later incorporated this balancing
act into the corporate opportunity doctrine test itself by adding a fourth
prong: does an officer or director create a conflict between his self-interest
and the interests of the corporation by taking the opportunity for him-
self?83 When applying Broz in a later case, however, the court again em-
phasized that “no single factor is dispositive,” and that “[i]nstead the
Court must balance all factors as they apply to a particular case.”84 Broz is
also important for its treatment of the requirement that an opportunity be
presented to the board before it is usurped (discussed further below).
C. Presentment of Opportunity to the Corporation as a Safe Harbor
In Broz, Robert Broz was a director of Cellular Information Systems
(CIS) and also the sole shareholder of RFBC.85 The suit alleged that, by
purchasing a cellular license over a bid by PriCellular (a company that was
simultaneously attempting to acquire CIS), Broz and RFBC violated a fi-
duciary duty to CIS.86 PriCellular brought suit in the name of CIS, alleging
that Broz had usurped a corporate opportunity of CIS and that he had a
duty to PriCellular, since they were trying to acquire CIS, even though the
opportunity was presented to Broz in his capacity as the owner of
RFBC.87 Broz argued that his duty was to CIS alone, and that CIS was
unable to purchase the license because it was undergoing a Chapter 11
reorganization that required it to sell the cellular licenses that it did
have.88 Broz did not take steps to hide the transaction from CIS and dis-
cussed the opportunity with a number of CIS officers and directors indi-
vidually.89 He took the position that a formal presentation of the
80. Id. (quoting Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 382 A.2d 564, 568 (Md. 1978)).
81. Id. at 962 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 cmt. b (1957)).
82. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 303 cmt. e. (1957)).
83. Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., 673 A.2d 148, 154-55 (Del. 1996).
84. Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 972
(Del. Ch. 2003).
85. Broz, 673 A.2d at 150.
86. Id. at 151.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 151-52.
89. Id. at 152.
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opportunity to the board was unnecessary because, among other reasons,
the company was in no position financially to take advantage of the oppor-
tunity.90 Although the Delaware Chancery Court had held that Broz had
usurped an opportunity rightfully belonging to CIS,91 the Delaware Su-
preme Court overturned the decision, holding that no single factor is dis-
positive and that formal presentment to the board is not strictly
necessary.92 The court went on to state, however, that where a director or
officer does take the step of formal presentment, he may enjoy the protec-
tion of a safe harbor and will be free from the danger of later being found
to have usurped an opportunity, since the board has disclaimed it.93
Cases succeeding Broz have reaffirmed the safe harbor, reiterating that
where the corporation had a clear interest in the opportunity, a director or
officer who chooses not to formally present the opportunity to the board
“acts at his peril, unless he is ultimately able to demonstrate post hoc that
the corporation was not deprived of an opportunity in which it had an
interest in or a capability of engaging.”94 In Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, the
court clarified that the safe harbor applies only when the opportunity is
formally presented to the board of directors; presentment of an opportu-
nity to an individual officer or director of the corporation (in Texlon, the
CEO) will not give the presenter the protections of the safe harbor be-
cause approving or rejecting a corporate opportunity is a decision that cor-
rectly lies with the corporation’s board of directors and not individual
members of the board.95
V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and the “Funneling of Business”
As discussed above, KCC Article 397-2 is recognized as a tool to regu-
late the so-called “Funneling of Business,” which is a practice often used
to increase or transfer the wealth of controlling shareholder-managers.
However, there are fundamental doubts about whether the corporate op-
portunity doctrine properly applies to the “Funneling of Business.”96
Whether a company transfers or consigns its existing business activities to
a third party, and to whom the activities are transferred or consigned, is a
matter of company discretion (i.e., it is a choice of “allocation of business
90. Id. at 151.
91. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc. v. Broz, 663 A.2d 1180, 1186-87 (Del. Ch. 1995).
92. Broz, 673 A.2d at 155, 158.
93. Id. at 158 n.10.
94. Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 442 n.7 (Del. 1996) (citing Broz, 673 A.2d
at 157).
95. See Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 263 (Del. 2001).
96. KIM, CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 18, at 320; Jaeyeong
Chang & Junhyeok Jung, Prohibition of Appropriation of Corporate Opportunity According
to the Amended KCC, 51 BUS. FIN. L. 31, 34 (2012).
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activities”).97 It is, therefore, difficult to consider “Funneling of Business”
a new corporate opportunity. A true corporate opportunity should be dis-
tinguishable from the company’s existing business. The “Funneling of Bus-
iness” is not so much a matter of corporate opportunity, then, as it is a
choice between internalizing or outsourcing its existing business; when
outsourced, the company must decide how and to whom. In other words,
while the recipient of the outsourced business might consider that business
to be a corporate opportunity, the act of outsourcing part of an existing
business should not itself be seen as a corporate opportunity, since an op-
portunity that is created by a company’s active operation and management
of its existing business is not deemed to be a corporate opportunity.98
To return to the case of Hyundai Motor, the company had been out-
sourcing its non-core businesses, including distribution, since well before
Hyundai Glovis was established.99 The distribution business was previ-
ously outsourced to Dongsuh Dynasty Co. Ltd. and SungWoo Corpora-
tion.100 The efficiency and customer service issues that characterized those
business arrangements led the management of Hyundai Motor to conclude
that it was necessary to establish an affiliate of its own to specialize in
distribution, and Hyundai Glovis was born.101 The initial decision to out-
source Hyundai Motor’s distribution needs to a non-affiliated company is
the type of business decision that would come under the protection of the
business judgment rule.102 The business judgment rule103 would also apply
to the decision to internalize a business function or to establish an affiliate
to meet the company’s business needs. In the Hyundai Motor Case, no
questions were raised about the outsourcing of distribution to other com-
panies before the establishment of Hyundai Glovis. However, once Hy-
undai Motor began to direct that business to a firm controlled by the
chairman and his son, civic groups and shareholders vocalized serious con-
97. Stephen J. Choi & Eric L. Talley, Playing Favorites with Shareholders, 75 S. CAL.
L. REV. 271, 305-07 (2002).
98. According to U.S. law, appropriation of corporate opportunity is limited to exter-
nal opportunities, that is, opportunities created by third parties or that arise from the com-
pany’s existing business. It does not apply to an opportunity created by a company’s active
conduct using its existing business. See Broz, 673 A.2d at 155 (Del. 1996). However, since
KCC Article 397-2 contains a broad definition of corporate opportunity, there is a strong
argument that, in Korea, Article 397-2 can be applied to the “Funneling of Business” con-
cept, as it was in the Hyundai Motor Case. Chun, supra note 51, at 200; Koo, supra note 42, at
125.
99. Seoul Central District Court [Seoul C.D. Ct.], 2008GaHab47881, Feb. 25, 2011 (S.
Kor.), at 43.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 43-44.
102. The above-reviewed Hyundai Motor Case raises these points. See Seoul Central
District Court [Seoul C.D. Ct.], 2008GaHab47881, Feb. 25, 2011 (S. Kor.).
103. For the Korean Supreme Court cases on the business judgment rule, see Hwa-Jin
Kim, Directors’ Duties and Liabilities in Corporate Control and Restructuring Transactions:
Recent Developments in Korea, OXFORD UNIV. COMP. L.F. (2006), available at http://ouclf.
iuscomp.org/articles/kim.shtml.
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cerns.104 Thus, the point of contention regarding the “Funneling of Busi-
ness” in Korea is not the funneling itself, but to whom the business is
funneled and whether it is done on terms that are fair and negotiated at
arm’s length.
As described above, a company’s existing business and the opportuni-
ties related to that existing business could be corporate opportunities for a
third party, but they are not “corporate opportunities” for that company
itself. In Korea, cases that are scrutinized as potential “Funneling of Busi-
ness” cases might involve (i) issues regarding the scope of applicability of
the prohibition on self-dealing transactions from the perspective of corpo-
rate law,105 (ii) issues regarding the wealth acquired by controlling share-
holders through “Funneling of Business” from the perspective of tax law,
or (iii) illegal supporting actions from the perspective of antitrust law.
It is appropriate, then, to resolve these issues under those applicable
areas of law. First, the KCC, amended as of April 14, 2011, tightened its
regulations on self-dealing transactions.106 Not only are transactions be-
tween a director and the company regulated, but transactions between the
company and its major shareholders, their spouses or relatives, and affili-
ated companies within a certain range, as prescribed by KCC Article 398,
are also regulated. Second, per the provisions of the amended Inheritance
Tax and Gift Tax Act, for corporations whose total turnover to a specially-
related corporation (the “Beneficiary Corporation”) is more than 30 per-
cent of all of its turnover, the controlling shareholders, their spouses, and
any relatives holding more than 3 percent of company’s shares, respec-
tively, are presumed to reap the company’s business profits as their own;
104. SHARE TRANSACTION REPORT, supra note 3. This point is made all the more clear
by the fact that, according to the Report, nearly all of the cases in which usurpation of corpo-
rate opportunity is doubtful turn on mega transactions between a company’s existing busi-
ness and another company in which the controlling shareholders’ families have significant
shares.
105. The regulation of self-dealing transactions emphasizes “fairness,” while the regula-
tion of appropriation of corporate opportunity emphasizes “disclosure.” E. G. Orlinsky & G.
J. Benoit, The Treacherous State of Director and Officer Conflicts of Interest, 37 MD. B. J. 36,
38 (2004).
106. KCC Article 398 states:
When a person falling under any of the following subparagraphs intends to engage in a
transaction with the company for his/her own account or for the account of a third party,
he/she shall in advance disclose material facts of the relevant transaction to the board of
directors and shall obtain approval therefrom. In such cases, the approval of the board
of directors shall be granted with two thirds or more of the total number of the directors,
and the relevant transaction shall be fair in terms of its particulars and procedures: 1. A
director or a major shareholder under Article 542-8(2)6; 2. The spouse and lineal as-
cendants or descendants of a person falling under subparagraph 1; 3. Lineal ascendants
or descendants of the spouse of a person falling under subparagraph 1; 4. A company in
which a half or more of the total number of issued and outstanding shares with voting
rights is held by a person falling under any of subparagraph 1 through 3, solely or jointly
with others, or its subsidiary company; 5. A company in which a half or more of the total
number of issued and outstanding shares with voting rights is held by a person falling
under any of subparagraph 1 through 3, together with a company falling under subpara-
graph 4.
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gift tax is then imposed on these profits.107 Finally, the Monopoly Regula-
tion and Fair Trade Act prohibits “assisting a person with a special inter-
est, or other companies by providing advanced payment, loans, manpower,
immovable assets, securities, goods, services, right on intangible proper-
ties, etc. thereto, or by transacting under substantially favorable terms
therewith[.]”108 It imposes regulatory measures, such as penalty
surcharges and corrective measures, and even criminal punishment for vio-
lation of its terms.109
In conclusion, the “Funneling of Business” concept is fundamentally
unrelated to the issue of appropriation of corporate opportunity; insofar as
the legislative intention behind KCC Article 397-2 was to address the fun-
neling problem, it has been flawed from its inception.
B. Drawbacks of KCC 397-2
Apart from the issue of whether the new Code provision should even
apply to the fact pattern of the Hyundai Motor Case, the doctrine, as
adopted, has inherent drawbacks, which we discuss below.110
1. The Ambiguity of the Meaning of “Corporate Opportunity”
KCC Article 397-2 (Prohibition against Appropriation of Company’s
Opportunities and Assets) specifies business opportunities that directors
are prohibited from usurping as follows:
A business opportunity which has become known to the director in the course
of performing his/her duty, or a business opportunity taking advantage of in-
formation of the company (subparagraph 1); and
A business opportunity closely related to the business that is being currently
conducted or is to be conducted by the company (subparagraph 2).
Such business opportunities must also have “present or future benefit to
the company.” It is difficult to determine, however, whether a certain
transaction falls under the scope of this definition, since the Code uses
abstract terms such as “business opportunity,” “future benefit to the com-
pany,” “business to be conducted by the company,” “closely related to,”
107. Gift Tax presumption is calculated as follows: after-tax business profit of Benefici-
ary Corporation X (Transaction rate with specially related corporation – 30 percent) X (per-
centage of share ownership – 3 percent). See Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act, Act No. 5193,
Dec. 30, 1996, art. 45-3, amended by Act No. 10361, June 8, 2010 (S. Kor.); Enforcement
Decree of the Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act, Presidential Decree No. 22042, Feb. 18,
2010, art. 34-2 (S. Kor.).
108. Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Act No. 3320, Dec. 21, 1980, art. 23(1)7,
amended by Act No. 9554, Mar. 25, 2009 (S. Kor.); Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly
Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Presidential Decree No. 10267, April 1, 1981, tbl. 1-2, as
amended (S. Kor.).
109. See Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Act No. 3320, Dec. 21, 1980, arts.
24, 24-2, 68(2), amended by Act No. 9554, Mar. 25, 2009 (S. Kor.).
110. See B. S. Moon & Kim Hwa-Jin, Corporate Opportunity Doctrine in the Draft New
Commercial Code, 30 CORP. GOVERNANCE REV. 15, 30-33 (2007); KIM, CORPORATE FI-
NANCE AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 18, at 326-29.
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and “taking advantage of.”111 One year after adoption, there is still not
sufficient academic analysis or case law precedent that speaks to the cor-
porate opportunity doctrine’s specific meaning and requirements under
the Code. Even in the U.S., where the corporate opportunity doctrine has
developed over decades, no precise definition for these concepts truly ex-
ists. Indeed, leading corporate law scholars in the U.S. continue to wrestle
with the imprecise nature of the doctrine, despite decades of analysis and
case law.112
In Korea, theoretical attempts to specify business opportunities that
cannot be usurped are based on principles of U.S. case law.113 Most U.S.
cases that have recognized a director’s liability based on his appropriation
of corporate opportunity are either (1) self-dealing transactions in a “verti-
cal” relationship (e.g., where there is a transaction between the director
and the company) and the director usurps the corporate opportunity, as in
the Guth case, discussed above; or (2) competitive business transactions in
a “horizontal” relationship (e.g., where a director’s business is in competi-
tion with the company’s business), as in the Broz case, discussed above.
Accordingly, it is difficult to apply the doctrine to a business opportunity
without a vertical or horizontal relationship, even in a broad sense (we will
refer to this theory as “Theory A”). On the other hand, some argue that
the standard applied by the Korean Supreme Court in the Hyundai Motor
Case, that is, restricting the scope of business opportunity to “realistically
existing specific business opportunities,” is reasonable because it relieves
businesses’ anxiety over the unsettled standard, at least until a clearer ap-
plication of KCC Article 397-2 is established (“Theory B”).114
Theory A, the notion that the doctrine is difficult to apply absent a
vertical or horizontal relationship, is useful in the sense that it implies that
appropriations of corporate opportunity mainly exist where there is a
“close relationship” to the business of a corporation because of a “compet-
itive business relationship” or “self-dealing relationship”.115 Nevertheless,
it still does not clearly define any standards for determining what a corpo-
rate opportunity is.116 Theory B is criticized on the basis that, since the
111. Of course, subparagraph 1 seems to be clearer, in that it can be read as information
obtained at company’s costs. The text of subparagraph 2, “closely related to the business[,]”
however, is a very vague concept.
112. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 62.
113. Chun, supra note 51, at 162-82.
114. CHOI JUNSUN, COMMENTARY ON THE AMENDED CORPORATE LAW 2011, at 128-29
(2011) [hereinafter CHOI JUNSUN, COMMENTARY]; SHIN HEUNGCHEOL, KOREA CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, MAIN CONTENTS OF THE AMENDED COMMERCIAL CODE AND
BUSINESS ACTIONS 16, (2011); Park Sun Jong, Appropriation of Corporate Opportunity
Under the Revised Commercial Code, 22 HANYANG L. REV. 240, 255 (2011).
115. However, this theory raises the question of whether, even without the new Article
on corporate opportunity, the same result could have been achieved by supplementing the
KCC’s Article 397, Prohibition against Competition, or Article 398, Self-Dealing Transaction.
116. Even according to the theory, since KCC Article 397-2 defines “corporate oppor-
tunity” very comprehensively, there are rarely cases where corporate opportunity may not be
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amended KCC has come into effect, there are no longer grounds to re-
strict business opportunity to “realistically existing specific business oppor-
tunities.” The standard that the Korean Supreme Court applied in the
Hyundai Motor Case was only reasonable, the argument goes, since at the
time of the judgment there was no explicit provision governing corporate
opportunity; business opportunity could be derived only from a director’s
duty of loyalty.117
Therefore, as there is no distinct standard under the law (or any ac-
cepted theories or case law on the question) as to what constitutes a “cor-
porate opportunity,” there is concern that courts could arbitrarily apply
the corporate opportunity doctrine.118 Furthermore, the existing ambigui-
ties may not only prevent Article 397-2 from functioning as a standard for
future action, but also induce risk aversion,119 impose unnecessary bur-
dens on companies, and repress entrepreneurial spirit. Corporate opportu-
nity doctrine has the benefit of preventing appropriation of corporate
opportunities by directors or fiduciaries, but the drawback of potentially
interfering with the establishment of new businesses.120
found under Article 397-2. Furthermore, the broad nature of corporate opportunity itself
should not prevent Article 397-2’s use, since to do so would be in contravention of the
amendment’s aim. KCC art. 397-2. See also Chun, supra note 51, at 179, 181 (explaining that
applying Article 397-2 in individual cases is a separate question).
117. Koo, supra note 42, at 125; Chun, supra note 51, at 181; LEE EONJU, KOREA
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUS., MAIN CONTENTS OF THE AMENDED COMMERCIAL
CODE AND BUSINESS ACTIONS 76-77 (2011).
118. KIM, CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 18, at 327.
119. According to KCC Article 400 paragraph 2, “A company may, in accordance with
its articles of incorporation, absolve the liability of a director under Article 399 with respect
to the amount exceeding six times (in cases of outside directors, three times) his/her remu-
neration (including bonuses and the profit from exercise of stock option) for the latest one
year prior to the date of the act or misconduct of the director.” KCC art. 400(2). However,
the liability of a director is strictly regulated because under KCC Article 397-2 the liability of
a director cannot be absolved. KCC art. 397-2. Furthermore, according to KCC Article 397-2
paragraph 2, “[T]he benefit earned by the director or a third party from the violation shall be
presumed to be the damage suffered by the company.” Id. Because it is presumed (but not
deemed), there is still a chance to disprove that fact. Nevertheless, the director has to prove
that the company would have had less profit if it had had such an opportunity, a very hard
burden for the director to meet. Moreover, according to the Korean Criminal Act Articles
355 and 356, a person “shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or by
a fine not exceeding fifteen million won[,]” where “a person who, administering another’s
business, obtains pecuniary advantage or causes a third person to do so from another in
violation of ones [sic] duty, thereby causing loss to such person.” Criminal Code, Act No.
293, Sept. 18, 1953, arts. 355-56, amended by Act No. 7623, July 29, 2005 (S. Kor.). The Su-
preme Court of Korea broadly interprets “in violation of one’s duty” as “including any act
that loses trust to a person, from not acting in trust and good faith, which is expected to be
done or not to be done, according to the relevant contents, nature, detailed circumstances of
the business.” Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 94Do902, Sept. 9, 1994 (S. Kor.). Therefore, directors
should consider the danger of a criminal penalty resulting from the appropriation of a corpo-
rate opportunity. There are discussions in Korea against punishing a director criminally for
the act of misappropriation. See Lee Jongsang, A Critical Review on Liability of Director and
Crime of Misappropriation, 19 BUS. FIN. L. 44, 44-64 (2006).
120. CHOI JUNSUN, COMMENTARY, supra note 114, at 124.
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A balanced solution is required that accounts for both impacts of the
doctrine. This is a difficult and nuanced question. Indeed, in the U.S., the
courts wrestled with this issue in the 1980s and 1990s in Science Accesso-
ries and Broz respectively, ultimately recognizing the public policy interest
in allowing free competition.121 U.S. law employs fiduciary principles to
address the issue by allowing agents to plan and develop new enterprises
while in the employ of another, so long as the agent acts in good faith and
such undertakings do not put the agent in a position antagonistic to his
principal.122 As discussed above, the Broz case incorporated this issue into
the corporate opportunity doctrine analysis by adding an element that
considers whether the agent’s actions create a conflict with the interests of
his principle.123
2. The Meaning of “Director Who Approved” According to KCC
Article 397-2 paragraph 2
KCC Article 397-2 paragraph 2 states that “a director who has violated
paragraph (1) and thereby incurred damage to the company and the direc-
tor who approved the same shall be jointly and severally liable for com-
pensation of the damage,” and since paragraph 1 states that “in order to
use any business opportunity of the company, an approval of the board of
directors (by two thirds or more of the total number of directors) is re-
quired,” it seems to be clear that “a director who has violated paragraph
(1)” is a director that usurped corporate opportunity without the approval
of the board of directors. But to whom is “director who approved” refer-
ring? If there were director approval, then it would mean that, at the very
least, there was no breach of paragraph (1). The provisions do not seem to
be coherently integrated.
The following are two possible interpretations of the contradicting pro-
visions: (i) the first is that the phrase “director who approved” only applies
to directors whose approval has violated their duty of good manager’s due
care and, as a result, have approved the appropriation of corporate oppor-
tunity (Theory I);124 and (ii) the second is that the phrase refers to a direc-
tor who gave a personal or de facto approval (which abets, aids, or
supports) with a knowledge of the appropriation of corporate opportunity
and without the formal approval of the requisite threshold of the board of
directors (Theory II).125
121. See Broz v. Cellular Info Sys., 673 A.2d 148, 157 (Del. 1996); Science Accessories
Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp., 425 A.2d 957, 962-63 (Del. 1980).
122. See Equity Corp. v. Milton, 221 A.2d 494, 497 (Del. 1966).
123. See Broz, 673 A.2d at 157.
124. See Chun, supra note 51, at 205. See also Chang & Jung, supra note 96, at 52; OK-
RIAL SONG, LECTURE ON COMMERCIAL LAW 1027 (2d ed. 2012).
125. KO CHANGHYEON, KOREA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, MAIN CON-
TENTS OF THE AMENDED COMMERCIAL CODE AND BUSINESS ACTIONS SEMINAR
SOURCEBOOK 54 (2011); Kim Heecheol, An Analysis of the Newly Enacted “Restriction of
Usurping Corporate Opportunity and Assets” in the Korean Commercial Code, 660 JUDICIAL
OFFICERS 208, 217 (2011).
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Neither theory fully resolves the contradiction of KCC Article 397-2
paragraph 2. According to Theory I, directors whose approval violated
their duty of good manager’s due care could be disciplined in accordance
with a violation of the duty of good manager’s due care itself, so that there
is not really a need to provide an independent means via Article 397-2.
Furthermore, it seems unreasonable that a director who actively usurped
corporate opportunity and a director who only approved the process
should face the same liability. According to Theory II, it seems strange to
interpret the “approval” in paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 differently. Fur-
thermore, if a director has usurped a corporate opportunity without the
approval of the board of directors, then that director has violated KCC
Article 397-2 paragraph 1, and directors who detect such an act must re-
port it to the company and ask for corrective measures according to their
inspection126 or reporting obligations.127
The legislative intent behind the adoption of KCC Article 397-2 is
likely more closely related to Theory I than Theory II,128 and Theory I is
reasonable according to a textual interpretation. Nonetheless, it seems
that the phrase “director who approved” in KCC Article 397-2 paragraph
2 ought to be deleted, and directors who did not usurp a corporate oppor-
tunity should be liable only for violating their duty of good manager’s due
care.129
3. Liability of Approving Directors
Where a director pursues a corporate opportunity in the manner con-
templated in Article 397-2 (i.e. the opportunity is reported to and ap-
126. According to the Korean Supreme Court, a director of a corporation must not only
approve or disapprove an agenda introduced to the board of directors, but also inspect the
overall business, including his or her business and other active directors’ business. Even a
part-time director has such obligations. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2005Da51471, Dec. 11, 2008
(S. Kor).
Inspection obligations could be different according to company’s size, organization, busi-
ness type, regulations, business conditions and financial standings, and in a highly di-
vided and specialized company, it could be inevitable that a joint representative director
and active director has its own specialized area to handle, but such circumstances cannot
exempt directors from their inspection obligations, and in such a case each director of
the board of directors has liability to construct reasonable information, reporting system
and internal control system, and when there was not such an effort or when directors
intentionally disregarded company’s inspection or supervision although there was such a
system, and as a result did not know the danger that directors had to care about includ-
ing illegal improper business, then directors cannot escape from their liability for a rea-
son that that they did not know the illegal or improper act of other directors, and if
damages occur from continuous organizational carelessness of inspection, directors have
liability for these damages occurred from other directors or officers.
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2006Da68636, Sept. 11, 2008 (S. Kor).
127. KCC Article 412-2 states, “If a director finds any fact that is likely to inflict a
substantial loss on the company, he/she shall immediately report such to its auditors.”
128. Koo, supra note 42, at 127.
129. Chang & Jung, supra note 96, at 52; Chun, supra note 51, at 205; SONG, supra note
124, at 1027.
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proved by the board of directors) and the other directors approve that
pursuit in violation of their duty of good manager’s due care, it is counter-
intuitive for the pursuing director to face liability for his actions. Accord-
ing to the U.S. Model Business Corporation Act § 8.70, Business
Opportunities,
(a) A director’s taking advantage, directly or indirectly, of a business opportu-
nity may not be the subject of equitable relief, or give rise to an award of
damages or other sanctions against the director, in a proceeding by or in the
right of the corporation on the ground that such opportunity should have first
been offered to the corporation, if before becoming legally obligated respect-
ing the opportunity the director brings it to the attention of the corporation
and: (1) action by qualified directors disclaiming the corporation’s interest in
the opportunity is taken in compliance with the procedures set forth in section
8.62, as if the decision being made concerned a director’s conflicting interest
transaction, or (2) shareholders’ action disclaiming the corporation’s interest
in the opportunity is taken in compliance with the procedures set forth in
section 8.63, as if the decision being made concerned a director’s conflicting
interest transaction; except that, rather than making “required disclosure” as
defined in section 8.60, in each case the director shall have made prior disclo-
sure to those acting on behalf of the corporation of all material facts concern-
ing the business opportunity that are then known to the director.
(b) In any proceeding seeking equitable relief or other remedies based upon
an alleged improper taking advantage of a business opportunity by a director,
the fact that the director did not employ the procedure described in subsec-
tion (a) before taking advantage of the opportunity shall not create an infer-
ence that the opportunity should have been first presented to the corporation
or alter the burden of proof otherwise applicable to establish that the director
breached a duty to the corporation in the circumstances.130
Nevertheless, many Korean scholars still argue that when the approval of
other directors131 constitutes a violation of the duty of good manager’s
due care, then the act usurping corporate opportunity is itself illegal, and
the director who approved such act in violation of his or her duty of due
care shall be held jointly and severally liable for the damage, since such
compensation is based on post-benefit correction.132
It stands to reason that, where a director has reported the corporate
opportunity to the company, has provided sufficient information for the
board to determine whether to take the opportunity, and has not exerted
any improper influence on other directors, such a result is excessive.
130. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.70 (2005).
131. KCC art. 391(3). As applied using KCC Article 391 paragraph 3, KCC Article 368
paragraph 4 would read, “no person who has special interests in a resolution by a [meeting of
board of directors] shall exercise his/her voting rights thereupon.” Therefore, a director who
is willing to use corporate opportunity shall not exercise his or her voting rights by a meeting
of board of directors for approving appropriation of corporate opportunity.
132. LEE CHEOLSONG, 2011 COMMENTARY ON AMENDED KCC 154 (2012) [hereinafter
LEE CHEOLSONG, 2011 COMMENTARY]; Choi Junseon, Corporate Opportunity, supra note 44,
at 126-27; Chun, supra note 51, at 200; Chung Chan- Hyung, Contents and Problems of 2011
Revised Korean Corporation Law, in SYMPOSIUM, SEOUL BAR ASSOCIATION/KOREAN LE-
GAL CENTER QUESTIONS ABOUT 2011 REVISION TO THE COMMERCIAL CODE 30 (2011).
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Where potential liability may arise despite a person’s adherence to proto-
col, the incentive for a director to pursue or participate in a new business
will decrease, leaving only negative effects of the prohibition on appropri-
ation of corporate opportunities. In other words, in practice, most of the
business opportunities that are likely to fall under scrutiny will arise from
the apt relationships and undertakings of the pursuing director, and, unless
the law provides a safe harbor for that director, strict scrutiny is being
imposed on the director’s entrepreneurial activities, while the action of the
board of directors is overlooked.133 The focus of the corporate opportu-
nity doctrine should instead be on regulating the presentation of corporate
opportunities to the board and the independence of their approval
process.
4. Quorum for Resolution by Board of Directors
KCC Article 397-2 requires that a business opportunity that is
presented to the board of directors be approved by two thirds of the
board.134 The quorum requirement under this Article is stricter than the
general quorum requirement under the KCC, which requires a majority of
the directors to be present at the meeting and the affirmative votes of a
simple majority of those present.135 The stricter quorum parameters are
specially applied to resolutions approving self-dealing transactions136 and
appropriations of corporate opportunities under the amended KCC. There
is no persuasive reason for increasing the quorum threshold for resolutions
regarding these two circumstances alone. In the U.S., a director or officer
seeking to pursue an opportunity that may belong to the corporation is not
required to make any presentation to the board of directors;137 if such a
presentation is made, the board may vote on the matter, but there is no
special quorum requirement. The rationale for requiring approval by the
board of directors in corporate opportunity cases is to ensure that the
company is aware of the potentially beneficial opportunity and may decide
whether to forego or pursue the opportunity. This can be accomplished
without the stricter quorum and approval requirements.138
Interestingly, where the board instead considers a resolution to over-
ride the statutory prohibition against a director’s ability to compete with
133. KIM, CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 18, at 326-27.
134. When counting the total number of directors, directors who are willing to use cor-
porate opportunity are excluded. See supra note 131. Such directors have special interest in a
resolution by a meeting of the board of directors, so that such director shall not exercise his/
her voting rights thereupon.
135. KCC art. 391(1). (“A resolution of the board of directors shall be adopted in the
presence of a majority of directors in office by the affirmative votes of a majority of directors
present at the meeting: Provided, that the voting requirement may be increased by the arti-
cles of incorporation.”).
136. KCC art. 397-2.
137. See Broz v. Cellular Info Sys., 673 A.2d 148, 158 (Del. 1996).
138. Park, supra note 114, at 250.
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the company (article 397 paragraph 1), the general quorum requirement
for resolution by the board of directors is applied, per KCC 391 paragraph
1 (i.e. the majority of the board must be present at the meeting and the
affirmative votes of a simple majority of directors present must be ob-
tained). However, the operation of a competing business is much more
likely to directly endanger the present, existing business of the company.
Indeed, a powerful right of intervention is available in the event of a viola-
tion of the prohibition against competitive business, so that stricter liabil-
ity is actually imposed in that circumstance than in situations of
appropriation of corporate opportunity.139 Therefore, it is inconsistent to
increase the quorum threshold for a resolution by the board in the case of
an appropriation of a corporate opportunity.140 Furthermore, the in-
creased affirmative vote requirement has the de facto effect of preventing
any operating committees within the board of directors141 from approving
the resolution, often preventing rapid decision-making.142
5. Outside Director Liability
The KCC imposes the same liability on both inside and outside direc-
tors for appropriation of corporate opportunities. This is questionable
logic considering the significant difference between directors who manage
the company and outside directors in terms of the accessibility to internal
information and the opportunity to divert property or resources of the
company. Given these disparities, corporate opportunity regulations appli-
cable to outside directors should be less stringent than those applicable to
directors who manage the company on a day-to-day basis.143 By compari-
son, the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance in the U.S. applies the
“line of business test” to CEOs and the “interest or expectancy test” to
outside directors.144 There are similar arguments in Korea that an outside
director’s liability should be restricted to those cases involving use of the
company’s information or assets closely related to current or future
business.145
6. Defense on the Ground of Corporate Inability
As discussed above, a director or officer in the U.S. may take a corpo-
rate opportunity without consulting the board when the company is unable
139. KCC art. 397(2).
140. LEE CHEOLSONG, CORPORATE LAW 730 (20th ed. 2012).
141. According to the KCC, the board of directors may establish committees composed
of two or more directors, within the board, as prescribed by the articles of incorporation, and
allows the board of directors to delegate its power to the committees (other than as prohib-
ited by law). KCC art. 393-2.
142. Chun, supra note 51, at 188-89.
143. KIM, CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 18, at 327.
144. See AM. LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 5.05 (1994).
145. Lee Yun Seok, A Study on Appropriation of Corporate Opportunity, 3 YGBL 119,
147-48 (2011) [hereinafter Lee, Appropriation].
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to pursue the opportunity (e.g., for financial reasons). In any case, where
the corporation is unable to pursue an opportunity, it follows that it can-
not establish wrongful appropriation of the opportunity merely by virtue
of the fact that it was taken by a director or officer. However, according to
KCC Article 397-2, there is no explicit provision setting forth a defense
based on corporate inability in Korea. Generally, the reasons for corpo-
rate inability are financial, legal (based on articles of association146 or
law), or a refusal to deal with the company by a potential counterparty.
There is an ongoing discussion over whether such a defense could be justi-
fied by KCC Article 397-2.147
In many situations it is difficult to determine objectively whether a
company is able to pursue an opportunity; an assessment by the board of
directors may be needed in order to establish such ability or inability. For
example, when (i) there is a short-term shortage in funds that could be
overcome with financing, (ii) business objectives are limited by the articles
of association but could be resolved by amending the articles, or (iii) there
is a way to persuade an objecting third party or regulator to support the
transaction, the potential inability may be overcome. When there is an
inability that, objectively, cannot be overcome by action of the board, then
such a situation should be recognized as a ground for defense, where the
burden of proof lies with the director. If such a defense is not recognized,
directors may be forced to disclose unnecessary or detrimental informa-
tion (e.g., that causes the loss of the opportunity), and the corporation
must call an otherwise unnecessary meeting of the board.148
146. According to the Supreme Court of Korea, the “Company’s capacity of enjoyment
of rights are limited to objects of laws that act as establishment basis for the company and
company’s articles of association, but an act in the area of company’s competence is not
limited to the competence stated in the articles of association, but includes direct, indirect
necessary acts, and when determining whether it is needed for performing its obligations, it
will be judged according to the act’s objective nature, not the performer’s subjective, specific
will.” Supreme Court [S. Ct.], No. 86Daka1349, Sept. 8, 1987 (S. Kor.).
147. According to Kim Hongki, Corporate Opportunity, supra note 52, at 117-18, corpo-
rate financial inability can be established as a ground for defense; however, according to
Park, supra note 114, at 257, a ground for defense should not be allowed to be established by
a director’s personal determination of inability, in lieu of the board’s. Meanwhile, according
to Bae Do, A Study on the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine, 21 SOONGSIL UNIV. L. REV. 79,
96 (2009), when a third party has provided opportunity to a director, but the director refused
to provide it to the corporation, then no corporate opportunity is established. On the other
hand, according to Kim Hongki, Corporate Opportunity, supra note 52, at 117-18, legal in-
ability or third party refusal cannot be permitted as grounds for a defense, since the taking of
a corporate opportunity violates the director’s duty of loyalty. Further, according to Kim
Jeongho, Doctrine of Corporate Opportunity, supra note 44, at 167, and Lee, Appropriation,
supra note 145, at 100, even corporate opportunity that could not have been pursued, as
dictated by law or the company’s articles of association, must still be provided to the corpora-
tion and measures to amend the articles of association or evade those law must be consid-
ered. By contrast, according to LEE CHEOLSONG, 2011 COMMENTARY, supra note 132, at 732,
since actionable corporate opportunities are limited to existing or future corporate benefit,
the corporation’s inability to pursue the opportunity should be a judgment factor in deter-
mining whether such benefit exists.
148. KIM, CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 18, at 327-28.
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As noted, the KCC approach to corporate inability is currently quite
different than the approach under U.S. law. While many aspects of the
U.S. corporate opportunity doctrine are imperfect, the safe harbor rule
propagated by the Broz and Texlon line of cases is an efficient and practi-
cal way to approach the matter of corporate inability. Permitting the direc-
tor or officer who is pursuing the opportunity to avoid a formal
presentation to the board and discussion of corporate inability, while at
the same time rewarding him for undertaking such discussions, when ap-
propriate, by protecting him from later liability, properly incentivizes the
parties to consider the issues of corporate opportunity and inability, but
also allows them to avoid disclosing sensitive information and calling un-
necessary meetings, when appropriate.
7. No Consideration of Conglomerates
In contrast to the U.S.,149 in which cases of corporate opportunity
usurpation tend to involve only individual corporations, Korea commonly
faces the issue in the context of conglomerates, a highly prevalent corpo-
rate structure in the country. When a business opportunity has presented
itself and the question of appropriation arises, it can be difficult to deter-
mine to which affiliated corporation under the conglomerate the business
opportunity truly belonged.
Such a problem surfaces most acutely when a director of one corpora-
tion is also a director of another corporation under the same conglomer-
ate. However, since KCC Article 397-2 regulates the appropriation of
corporate opportunity both inside a conglomerate and of a third party, this
challenge is not limited to circumstances of concurrent directorship. In or-
der to solve this issue of proper ownership of the business opportunity, the
opportunity’s nature should be evaluated. It should first be considered
whether the opportunity can be used together by several corporations.
When an opportunity can only be enjoyed by one corporation, then the
opportunity should belong to the most appropriate company. If that com-
pany chooses not to pursue the opportunity, then it should pass to the next
most appropriate company.150 This argument can only be applied when
there is a fixed standard to regulate how to allocate common business op-
149. In U.S. cases, nearly all issues regarding appropriation of corporate opportunity
pertain to individual corporations. There are not many cases where appropriation between
affiliates of conglomerates was concerned apart from Sinclair Oil Corp v. Levien, 280 A.2d
717 (Del. 1971), and Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919 (Del. 1956), which contained a differ-
ent, but somewhat analogous, fact pattern. See Part IV.B, supra.
150. Chun, supra note 51, at 186. Cf. Terence Woolf, The Venture Capitalist’s Corporate
Opportunity Problem, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 473, 496-497 (2001) (“[Venture Capitalists]
do not make investments in a single enterprise, but instead allocate resources across a differ-
ent number of companies . . . [So] [i]f fiduciary duties were strictly enforced, VCs like Apex
would not be able to make investments in multiple ventures . . . . If fiduciary duties do not
provide any ascertainable benefit to a company or its shareholders, but instead create nega-
tive costs by preventing directors, officers and [VC] firms from investing their human and
economic capital in other ventures, logic would dictate that the imposition of such duties
should be relaxed. The Revised Uniform Partnership Act and the Uniform Limited Liability
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portunities between affiliates. In reality, it is very hard to create such a
standard.151
In Korea, in particular, shareholders and corporations are treated as
entirely different personalities. The Supreme Court of Korea has ruled
that internal transactions between a parent company and its wholly-owned
subsidiary are unfair, since it failed to recognize that such transactions do
not create agency costs.152 While focusing on the need for regulation, the
legislation of KCC Article 397-2 overlooked the unique conglomerate en-
vironment in Korea and left unresolved many unresolved issues particular
to those conglomerates.
VI. HOW TO APPROACH FAVORITISM
A. Was Tunneling Involved?
Favoring an individual or a company in a commercial transaction
should not be per se illegal. Freedom of contract protects our choice of
counterparty. The trouble is that interested corporate managers exercise
their power to choose the counterparty. What if the personal interest of
the manager wrongly affects the choice? Even in such cases, if nobody in
the company is worse off after the managerial decision, i.e., if the price
was fair, then what is the problem?153
Let us revisit the Hyundai Motor Case. Hyundai Motor had been out-
sourcing its distribution services since well before the establishment of Hy-
undai Glovis and simply shifted its existing outsourced business to a new
provider: Hyundai Glovis. From Hyundai Motor’s perspective, the only
difference is that the new counterparty is an affiliate, the shareholders of
which were CEO Chung Mongkoo, director of Hyundai Motor and con-
trolling shareholder of Hyundai Motor Group, and his son. Yet, is it really
important to Hyundai Motor who the other party to the transaction is and
what corporate governance that other party has? For Hyundai Motor, it
seems that only the business terms of the relationship truly matter. For
example, let us assume that Apple Inc. (“Apple”) decided to change its
manufacturer/supplier for a product’s display device from Samsung Elec-
tronics Co., Ltd. (“Samsung Electronics”) to LG Electronics Inc. (“LG
Company Act provides a means to address this misallocation, by allowing parties to waive
their fiduciary duties through a system of disclosure, negotiation and contract.”).
151. Choi Munhui, Appropriation of Corporate Opportunity in Conglomerates, 19 BFL
22, 38-41 (2006). In theory, there are other standards of allocation that have been proposed:
(i) to calculate net present value of business opportunity of each company and give the op-
portunity to the company with the highest value, (ii) to give the opportunity to a subsidiary
instead of a holding company; when there is more than one subsidiary, then give the opportu-
nity to the subsidiary with the lowest holding company shares, and (iii) to allocate the oppor-
tunity proportionally to the market value of the company. Yet, none of these proposals have
sufficient legal grounds to serve as a complete standard of allocation. Furthermore, it is not
always possible to apply such standards to specific cases.
152. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], No. 2001Du7411, Sept. 5, 2003 (S. Kor.).
153. See generally Choi & Talley, supra note 97.
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Electronics”). What matters to Apple is which company, Samsung Elec-
tronics or LG Electronics, is better able to satisfy Apple’s manufacturing
and supply needs. Arguably, it does not really matter who owns Samsung
Electronics or LG Electronics.
So, then, why did the shareholders of Hyundai Motor question the
transaction with Hyundai Glovis? Perhaps the shareholders believed that
Hyundai Motor had been harmed, since, had Hyundai Glovis been estab-
lished instead as a wholly-owned subsidiary, Hyundai Motor could have
obtained the profits earned by that affiliate through cost cutting, a share
dividend, or an increase in share prices. Yet, such questions are unreasona-
ble. According to theories of law and economics, there are two ways by
which to organize production and establish order between divisions in the
society: (i) a market or (ii) an organization such as a corporation.
When organizing via a market structure, transaction costs are inevita-
ble; when organizing through organizations, the same is true of organiza-
tion costs.154 If a corporation, either by itself or through affiliates,
internalizes any function, its transaction costs would likely decrease and its
organization costs increase. Organization costs depend on a corporation’s
initial investment costs (including opportunity costs), the risk of failure,
the likely ability to continue its business, its investment capability, its fi-
nancial situation, the ability to hire professionals, its maintenance costs,
and the quality of its goods or services.155 If Hyundai Motor were to con-
duct its own distribution or establish Hyundai Glovis as a wholly-owned
affiliate, it could conceivably reduce its transaction costs, lessen the risk of
not finding a competitive price, and gain the direct profit from transacting
distribution services. It should be noted, however, that in doing so, Hy-
undai Motor also bears the risk of business failure and the organization
and maintenance costs. Therefore, it is hard to conclude that Hyundai Mo-
tor would have actually gained all the profits that Hyundai Glovis has
gained had the transaction occurred differently. Furthermore, it is impossi-
ble to consider the profits of Hyundai Glovis as loss of profit (damages) to
the shareholders of Hyundai Motor.
Even if the decision not to internalize the distribution business was
both appropriate and given proper consideration, was it improper to give
the business to a corporation established by controlling shareholders of
Hyundai Motor Group? If the outsourcing of distribution services itself
was appropriate, then no damage occurred by outsourcing the business to
a corporation established by controlling shareholders of Hyundai Motor
Group. On the other hand, one might expect that the transactions between
Hyundai Motor and Hyundai Glovis were not at arm’s length and, thus,
for one or the other to reap the benefit. As anticipated, the court did find
154. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, THE NATURE OF THE FIRM—
ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT AT 18-30 (1993).
155. Transactions will be internalized to the extent that the increased organizational
cost does not exceed transaction cost. The corporation will “extend” itself by doing internally
everything that is cheaper than relying on external parties.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\3-1\MPE102.txt unknown Seq: 32  4-APR-14 15:49
72 Michigan Journal of Private Equity & Venture Capital Law [Vol. 3:41
that the above-market freight charges applied had caused damages
equivalent to KRW 14.3 billion to Hyundai Motor.
To this end, there does appear to have been tunneling.156 However, the
tunneling did not occur from Hyundai Motor’s outsourcing its distribution
services, but instead from unfairly high freight charges. This clear conflict
of interest arising from counterparty identity should be regulated by KCC
Article 398, the Code section regulating self-dealing transactions.157 If it is
not in the realm of Article 398,158 then it should be regulated by the direc-
tor’s duty of good manager’s due care in determining the terms of a
transaction.159
B. The Business Judgment Rule
In the end, the business judgment rule160 underlies our entire discus-
sion.161 In the Hyundai Motor Case, whether to internalize Hyundai Mo-
tor’s distribution service or to outsource them was a matter of the
directors’ duty of good manager’s due care, requiring a comparison of
transaction costs and organization costs. These considerations are a matter
156. Tunneling is the transfer of a company’s resources for the controlling holder’s own
benefit through self-dealing transactions, expropriation of corporate opportunities, or other
methods. See generally, Vladimir Atanasov, Bernard Black & Conrad S. Ciccotello, Law and
Tunneling, 37 J. CORP. L. 1 (2011). For a discussion of tunneling from a Korean perspective,
see Kee-Hong Bae et al., Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean
Business Groups, 57 J. FIN. 2695 (2002).
157. See generally Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Related Party Transactions, in THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 101 (2004); Koen Geens & Marieke Wyckaert, Conflicts of
Interest: Can a Director Serve Himself or His Kin?, in VOC 1602-2002 400 YEARS OF COM-
PANY LAW, 387 (Ella Gepken-Jager et al. eds., 2005).
158. As discussed in Part V, supra, KCC Article 398 expanded the notion of the
counterparty in a self-dealing transaction. Yet, the transaction between Hyundai Glovis and
Hyundai Motor is, as under the former KCC, not regulated as a self-dealing transaction.
159. The KFTC, which imposed a penalty surcharge on Hyundai Motor, questioned the
fact that, as a newly established company, Hyundai Glovis’s business capabilities had not
been verified at the time that Hyundai Motor began outsourcing its business to Hyundai
Glovis. However, Hyundai Glovis had taken over an existing company that had previously
been entrusted with Hyundai Motor’s distribution business. Furthermore, since the Court
recognized in the Hyundai Motor Case that Hyundai Glovis had developed an integrated
distribution system and increased the effectiveness of the distribution system of the affiliates,
it is hard to attribute any damages suffered by Hyundai Motor to Hyundai Glovis’s lack of
ability.
160. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“The business
judgment rule is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corpora-
tion acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company.”); Cf. Dennis J Block, Stephen A. Radin & James P.
Rosenzweig, The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in Shareholder Litigation at the Turn of
the Decade, 45 BUS. LAW 469 (1990); Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic
and Behavorial Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U.
L. REV. 675 (2002).
161. Regarding the business judgment rule in Korea, see supra note 102.
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of business judgment. The same applies to the matters of to whom to out-
source business and under what conditions it should be outsourced.
The court ruled on the issue as follows:
Hyundai Glovis’s distribution services are in fact, an assistance service for Hy-
undai Motor Group’s manufacture and sales, however an automobile com-
pany does not have to directly conduct its distribution services or establish a
subsidiary for its service on grounds that distribution services are related to or
contingent upon automobile businesses. Whether to outsource its business is
not dependent upon relevance to or contingency upon the company’s busi-
ness, rather it is determined according to business judgment. Thus, whether to
establish an internal business unit, establish a subsidiary or outsource it to
another company for already outsourced the distribution serves, is fundamen-
tally at the discretion of the company’s business judgment.162
The court thus recognized that the decision to outsource was legal accord-
ing to the business judgment rule but held that increased freight charges
for Hyundai Glovis could not be legitimized under the business judgment
rule.
Although the “Funneling of Business” practice, like that seen in the
Hyundai Motor Case, is not considered an appropriation of a corporate
opportunity, it is a matter of business judgment. If information regarding
the corporate opportunity is fully disclosed, and the board of directors de-
cides through a careful and reasonable process163 that it is for the benefit
of the corporation not to pursue such an opportunity, then this decision
should be protected by the business judgment rule.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article reviewed the controversial corporate opportunity doctrine
as it was discussed and promulgated as law in Korea and analyzed the
doctrine in the context of the Hyundai Motor Case. One cannot question
that the corporate opportunity doctrine has both legitimacy and a useful
purpose as a well-founded iteration of the director’s duty of loyalty. How-
ever, the incorporation of the corporate opportunity doctrine into the
KCC may have been premature, as the debate surrounding the concept
and the legal nature of the duty of loyalty is not yet sufficiently settled.
The corporate opportunity doctrine is derived from U.S. case law,
where it is still a somewhat abstract concept that incorporates different
elements and analytical frameworks as the fact patterns change; it is nearly
impossible to establish a workable and flexible doctrine in a few codified
provisions. Moreover, the doctrine was introduced as law in Korea specifi-
cally to regulate the so-called “Funneling of Business,” a concept that lies
outside the scope of the corporate opportunity doctrine in the US. This
makes the development of KCC Article 397-2 in Korea even more diffi-
162. Seoul Central District Court [Seoul C.D. Ct.], 2008GaHab47881, Feb. 25, 2011 (S.
Kor.), at 45.
163. Cf. Henry R. Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business Judg-
ment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971 (1994).
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cult, calling for an approach that is unique from that in the U.S. and more
tailored to particulars of the Korean business environment. On these ba-
ses, we conclude that the Korean corporate opportunity doctrine needs
substantial refinement before it can become a workable solution to the
specific problems facing Korean corporate law today.
